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ABSTRACT
Board of director member diversity has an impact on the functions each director successfully
provides. Appropriate and necessary board member capabilities differ between small and large
firms. Although these differences seem apparent, current research has favored studies related to
large firms and neglected those related to board member needs of small firms. Grounded in Agency
Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, the following manuscript theoretically suggests that
firm size moderates the relationship between board member diversity and the two primary
functions (monitoring and the provision of resources) of board members. Furthermore, small firms
can enhance performance through appropriate member composition in differing ways than large
firms.
Keywords: Firm size, Board composition, Resource Dependency theory, Agency theory
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provision of resources, respectively. The
results ultimately lead to a final proposition
suggesting a means for small firms to enhance
firm performance through strategic board
member selection.

INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have led to great
expansions in technology and available data.
With that said, the vast benefits of these
sources also come with some drawbacks,
particularly in board of director research. A
great deal of this research has focused on large
firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004) leaving
us, as a field, somewhat speculative as to the
various impacts that boards of directors and
boards of advisors may have on small firm
performance. The board may in fact play
different roles in small and large firms due to
differences in monitoring and resource
provisions, therefore it is necessary to
consider the integration of these theories (e.g.,
Agency Theory and Resource Dependence
Theory) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) as they
pertain to differences in firm size. As small
firms may be resource constrained (both in
information and tangible resources), finding
and compensating a board may present
difficulties. Due to these reasons, amongst
others, the following manuscript attempts to
answer a handful of questions related to this
gap in the literature. First, could small firms
benefit from different board members more or
less than large firms? Second, does firm size
have implications on board monitoring and the
provision of resources?

This research contributes to the literature in
three primary ways. First, it is of interest to the
collective body of board of director research
to better understand differences between large
and small firms. Because small firms have
been somewhat neglected in this body of
work, this manuscript addresses the need to
advance the discourse as pertaining to various
firm sizes. Secondly, as developed through the
integration of two theories and various aspects
of boards of directors, attention is drawn to
more careful consideration of board selection
in small firms. Lastly, this research provides
practical means for small firms to enhance
performance. Because an overwhelming
majority of firms are small (U. S. Census
Bureau, 2012), this issue applies to the great
majority of businesses in which the
effectiveness of the board is a socially
complex phenomenon both within the firm
and with external constituencies.
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
Agency Theory and Boards
Essentially,
AT
utilizes
“alternative
governance structures to mitigate the agency
conflict” (Kochhar, 1996: 715) and is used to
identify the problems that may occur as
managers, rather than owners oversee
business operations. As Eisenhardt (1989)
points out, the agency problem occurs when
principals and agents have different desires
while at the same time are embedded in a
context presenting difficulty for principals to
verify agent behavior. To minimize these
agency
problems,
two
governance
mechanisms are emphasized: incentive

To assess these questions, this manuscript
utilizes prior information on board
composition as an antecedent to board
member diversity. Firm size is then described
as having a moderating effect between board
member diversity and the functions of a board.
Next, this paper extends on prior research
through the integration of Agency Theory
(AT) and Resource Dependence Theory
(RDT) (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011;
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) to better explain the
dual board functions, monitoring and the
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compensation and governance structures
(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997;
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Jensen & Meckling,
1976).

Resource Dependency Theory and Boards
Given firms work in an open and interacting
environment (Thompson, 1967), they are
situated in a context full of uncertainty and
interdependence (Knight, 1921; MacMillan &
Katz, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It is
here where managers have the ability and
obligation to attempt to control for this
uncertainty
and
to
reduce
various
dependencies. Gaining and maintaining power
is focal to reducing dependency. Emerson
(1962) provided the groundwork for the
concept of power dependence which was later
applied in the organizational setting to control
for resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984).

The emphasis of this research, as it pertains to
AT, will focus on monitoring, being that
monitoring the structure and composition of
the boards of directors is a primary function
marrying AT and boards. Here, stockholders
can use boards of directors as a mechanism for
monitoring executives (Fama & Jensen,
1983). Many researchers (e.g., Baysinger &
Butler, 1985; Daily, 1995) have given
preference toward independent outside
directors to make up board composition in
order to better satisfy the monitoring function.
Such a scheme suggests insiders would not act
independently and therefore compose a board
weaker in monitoring management whereas
nonaffiliated directors provide stronger
monitoring as the disincentive to monitor is
removed (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Although
AT is the most widely used theory when
focusing on boards of directors (Dalton, Hitt,
Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Hillman, Withers, &
Collins, 2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstand,
1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), much of the AT
literature on boards of directors has
undertaken samples of large public companies
to analyze the monitoring mechanism (e.g.,
Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998; Nyberg,
Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010).
However, this is not the boards’ only
application, albeit perhaps being the most
straightforward. Boards can also monitor
firms in smaller private organizations, a focal
point of this paper.

Studying boards of directors through a RDT
lens leads to great benefits and many studies
have asserted that RDT has provided for a
better understanding of boards through
theoretical and empirical analysis 2 including
topics such as board size and composition
(Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer, 1972). Directors
with access to various resources provide
valuable impacts at the firms in which they sit
(Boyd, 1990). These resources are not onedimensional and in fact, can be broken down
into a number of subcategories. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) provide insight to the four
primary ways in which directors add value to
organizations. These include: advice,
legitimacy, and access to information and
resources. These categories, as applied to
small and large firms will be further
differentiated later in this manuscript.
Notably, more recent research follows this
trend. Hillman and colleagues developed a
taxonomy also suggesting directors provide
varying degrees of expertise and resources in
RDT roles. (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold,
2000).

2 Institutional Theory may indicate that boards are
assembled to manage legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).

We note this importance and consider IT to be
subsumed under RDT in the present context.
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to follow suit in a similar integrative fashion
yet in a different context with greatest
emphasis toward small firm board
composition recommendations.

Although some point out the limitations of
RDT (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), it has
stood the test of time providing a sociological
theoretical underpinning and explaining a
great deal in strategic management. The RDT
presence in corporate governance is quickly
approaching the prominent AT perspective.
While each theory provides a unique
perspective, the collaboration of the two
provides a more complete lens to view the role
of the board of directors.

FORMAL PROPOSITIONS
Firm Size
Firm size is a dimension of the meta-analysis
conducted by Dalton and colleagues (1998).
Although they focus more specifically on the
influence of the insider versus outsider board
member, they explicitly note that firm size is
important. Through the lens of firm size, it is
suggested that a larger firm would mask the
impact that a board might have (Dalton, Daily,
Ellstand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton & Kesner,
1983). However, larger firms have great
complexity and hence potentially greater
uncertainty. Under the RDT umbrella, this
may increase the need for desired
relationships to control for these complexities
and uncertainties (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In
their meta-analysis (Dalton et al., 1998), they
continuously point to the complexities that
arise in dealing with larger firms, not only
from the RDT perspective, but also from an
agency perspective as CEOs may try to
carefully control the information given to the
board.

RDT and AT
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) were seminal in
integrating these theories as they pertain to
corporate directors. They differentiate the two
functions of corporate directors by
underpinning the monitoring function in AT
and the provision of resources function in
RDT. Others have also more recently
integrated these theories for various
governance purposes. Arthurs and colleagues
(2009) focus on mitigating the agency and
resource dependence challenges and examine
governance mechanisms when firms enter the
IPO stage based on their resource
dependencies. Amongst other conclusions,
they find that when ventures are dependent on
key entrepreneurs, firms seek directors with
greater start-up experience and a higher level
of contingent compensation (Arthurs,
Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009). By
also integrating AT and RDT, Callen, Klein,
and Tinkelman (2009) find that the theories
are complementary yet address different
components of nonprofit performance, but
with the caveat that RDT produces stronger
statistical results. This section is not to provide
an entire literature review, but rather
emphasize the seminal work of Hillman and
Dalziel (2003), while also providing the work
of like-minded scholars more recently
merging these two theories with emphasis on
corporate governance. This manuscript looks

Smaller firms may provide boards with greater
influence over the firm (in comparison to
larger firms) (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1993;
Eisenhardt
&
Schoonhoven,
1990).
Accordingly, this might lead to more thorough
monitoring and better utilization of provision
of resources provided by the various directors.
From the perspective of board contributions,
this may lead smaller firms to more efficiently
capitalize on resources as well as more readily
adjust their strategies (Dalton et al., 1998).
Interestingly, despite this potential for
improving firm performance for smaller
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need to further incorporate moderating
variables such as firm size in order to examine
other contextual factors.

firm’s utilization of board members, little
research has been conducted in this area
(Bennett & Robson, 2004; Kroll, Walters, &
Le, 2007; Nelson, 2003; ) and Filatotchev and
Bishop (2002) allude to the potentially
different governance structures based on firm
size.

Many authors conclude that greater
proportions of outside directors lead to more
effective boards (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989;
Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), with
the term effective implying some form of firm
performance. This is a clear case of an AT
presence in that outside directors will better
monitor CEO and/or top management teams
through separating ownership and control
(Dalton et al., 1998). Although stewardship
theory is not a focus of this manuscript, there
is also some support from this theory that in
fact, inside directors would actually make for
better board members (Davis et al., 1997;
Kesner, 1988). Sharing this news however is
no way ground breaking and there have been
many contradicting studies and little
consistency with regard to board composition
on firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). As
identified by prior integrative models (Zahra
& Pearce, 1989), composition also consists of
more than just an inside/outside director
comparison. Size and minority representation
are also common considerations. Although
there have been some differences addressed in
prior research, the great breadth and depth of
the various composition findings lead to the
belief that composition is in fact important,
and the board make-up will have an impact on
monitoring and the provision of resources.
While prior research has attempted to address
board composition via outside versus inside
members, one area of board composition
worthy of further exploration is the
differences stemming from gender. Presently,
there are no studies outlining these differences
at the board member level despite the
extensive literature base outlining differing
levels of new venture start-up and resulting
firm performance between women and men

Small and large firms may face different
competitive situations, dynamics, and needs
from their board members. For the purposes of
this paper, precisely defining small and large
firms is not overly necessary. The present
concern is directed toward the needs of small
firms, and since they have been underrepresented in the studies on both governance
and boards of directors, the aforementioned
and following rationale will hopefully help to
build some better practices for small
businesses to consider when designing and
creating their board of directors (or in some
cases, board of advisors).
Board Composition
Board member composition has been studied
over multiple decades and has been intensely
analyzed to find whether or not differences in
composition impact various issues such as
performance (e.g., Baysinger & Butler, 1985;
Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Dalton, Daily,
Johnson, & Ellstand, 1999; Zahra & Pearce,
1989), ownership structure (Kroll et al., 2007),
bankruptcy (Gales & Kesner, 1994), and
leadership structure (Dalton et al., 1998) to
name just a few. Others have more specifically
addressed issues within compositions such as
the impact of outside directors (Peng, 2004),
balancing family influence (Anderson &
Reeb, 2004), shareholder wealth and dividend
policies (Schellenger, Wood, & Tashakori,
1989) and so forth. However, because metaanalyses have shown unclear linkages
between board composition and performance
(Dalton, et al., 1998), this may suggest the
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members are asked to serve. Given this,
Forbes and Milliken (1999) contend that these
experiences shape executive perception. In
other words, the decisions made by owners
and board members alike, are shaped by one’s
collective experience.

entrepreneurs (Fairlie & Robb, 2009; Kelley,
Brush, Greene, & Litovsky, 2013; Lerner &
Almor, 2002). By using gender as a lens to
assess board composition, we offer insights
into how the strategic planning and business
experiences may shed further light on the
human capital resource gap between women
and men owners (Fairlie & Robb, 2009).

A review of the literature has identified
numerous differences between male and
female entrepreneurs, but do these differences
also transfer to the board room? We purport
that the differences in experiences may lead to
different cognitive perceptions for the board
member and hence, do transfer. For example,
female entrepreneurs have more difficulties
with raising start-up capital (Carter & Cannon,
1992) and securing loans (Verheul, Risseeum,
& Bartelse, 2002). As a board member, a
female with these experiences may be willing
to risk less capital for business growth due to
perceptions of capital availability. This risk
aversion may lead to initially lower returns,
however, Robinson (2007) found that women
owned businesses are less likely to end in
bankruptcy, when compared with the
businesses run by men. Johnston (2013)
offered support along this line of rationale and
concluded that female entrepreneurs, in many
instances, exhibit stronger ability in handling
workplace pressures.

Effective strategic planning may be critical for
newly created businesses and vital in the
growth of existing firms (Wiklund &
Shepherd, 2003). A dynamic planning process
can play an important role in predicting firm
performance (Brinckmann, Grichnik, &
Kapsa, 2010). In addition, prior research
suggests that women invest in strategic
planning to augment business performance
(Lerner & Almor, 2002). While men also
engage in strategic planning, the strategic
focus of the planning efforts for women may
be different than that for men (Gibson, 2010).
The planning horizon for women typically
spans further into the future, when compared
with that of men who are more short-term
focused (Sandberg, 2003). These differences
in focus are likely to lead to differences in
management values between men and women
business owners (Carter & Cannon, 1992). For
instance, men are more likely to measure the
success of their strategies via quantitative
measures such as profitability and market
position, while women are more likely to
measure the success of their strategies more
qualitatively, such as personal satisfaction and
customer service (Van Aueken, Gaskill, &
Kao, 1993). As a result of these differences,
the path to business success for female
entrepreneurs is likely different than the path
experienced by that of male entrepreneurs.

We included a question in this section, “do
these differences transfer to the board room?”
Cognitive behavior of any executive,
including board members, is influenced by an
individual’s experience. “Modes of thinking
are gender-specific” (Rowley, Lee, & Lan,
2015: 206). Given this journey, the
experiences and expertise of the individual
will be different for women than for men.
Therefore, the perceptions and cognitive
behaviors that form the foundation of his or
her cognitive processes will influence how an
individual views and engages in monitoring

Bennett and Robson (2004) noted that
experience, advice, and expertise are
consistently ranked as the top reasons board
46
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firms will likely attempt to attain properly
diverse boards to utilize these varying
strengths as pertaining to the firm needs. This
is particularly important for smaller firms
because they typically have fewer employees,
a less diverse workforce, and fewer skills sets.
However, creating diverse boards with a
combination of inside and outside directors,
men and women, and varying skill sets can
help boards reduce this gap. Additionally,
empirical studies show that this diversity of
board of directors is significant for the
strategic planning of small firms (Robinson,
1982). While the CEO of a large firm is tasked
with the role of leading the firm’s enterprisewide strategy, small business owners are
forced to deal with daily operational issues,
and any planning that does occur is much more
ad hoc. Through the board, a small firm can
formalize its planning process, allowing it to
achieve better returns (Ackelsberg & Arlow,
1985). Thus, the board of a small firm inherits
some of the role traditionally performed by a
top management team of large firms, in which,
heterogeneity has shown to be positively
related to firm performance (Hambrick, Cho,
& Chen, 1996). Accordingly, we present the
following proposition:
Proposition 1: In comparison to large
firms, small firms can gain a greater
and more impactful access to skills and
resources through board member
diversity.

and the provisioning of resources. In
accordance with RDT, companies should
select board members based on the
individual’s ability to help address the
company’s needs (Valenti, Mayfield, & Luce,
2010). Given the differences in female and
male entrepreneurial experiences, we contend
that small firms should consider gender, along
with outside versus inside expertise when
evaluating board composition.
The composition of the board impacts the
characteristics of board members (Dalton et
al., 1998; Provan, 1980). Relevant dimensions
of board of director diversity can come in
various forms such as education, training, and
work experience (Zald, 1969), as well as
through interlocks (Mizruchi & Stearns,
1988), stakeholder positions (Hillman, Keim,
& Luce, 2001), political experience (Hillman,
2005) and so forth. The characteristics that
members possess have important implications
regarding the capabilities which they may be
able to offer a firm. As imagined, these
characteristics can make a board more or less
diverse and have been fairly well studied and
synthesized over the course of the past few
decades (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al.,
1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
These characteristics play a considerable role
in accomplishing their responsibilities
involving control, service, and resource
dependence (Johnson et al., 1996). Various
studies were conducted over the past four
decades which helped to identify important
board characteristics (Vance, 1968) and
beliefs and attitudes (Norburn, 1986) that help
to make them more successful (Sonnenfeld,
2002). Ultimately, many would argue that the
characteristics may lie in their abilities to
monitor and provide resources (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003). Thus, as firms realize that
individual members provide various skills,

Board Functions
As alluded to in the theoretical development,
this manuscript adopts the perspective of
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) in that boards take
on two primary functions: monitoring through
an AT perspective or providing resources
through the RDT perspective. However, why
does it have to be either-or? As they (Hillman
& Dalziel, 2003) eloquently integrated the
theories, note that it doesn’t necessarily have
47
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in large and small firms more similar or more
different?

to be either-or, but that the two theories can
work together to provide a valuable alternative
to the conflicting camps.

Monitoring relies heavily on the board of
directors (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Furthermore, in larger firms where there are
likely more employees, managers, executives
and so forth, the monitoring function increases
in complexity as there is more personnel to
oversee. Additionally, CEOs and managers
are less likely to be owners in larger firms.
Conversely, the monitoring function differs in
smaller firms due to the nature of their
ownership structure. Small firms are more
likely to have hands-on owners (Reynolds,
2004), have less disconnect between investors
and owners due to small bank lending
(Jayaratne & Wolken, 1999) and internal
funding (Hamilton & Fox, 1998), have
compensation plans naturally integrated into
firm performance more comparable to other
staff (Tice, 2011), and finally, have fewer
owners and managed by the owners. Although
agency costs are not fully removed in small
firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz,
2001), there are fewer principal-agent
contracts to monitor in small firms. From this,
the traditional monitoring role of the board is
lessened, which allows the board of a small
firm to focus on other strategic issues.
Proposition 2: Monitoring functions
will differ based on size of the firm such
that monitoring will play a lesser role
for boards of directors in smaller
firms.

Others have also followed suit in integrating
these two theories when it comes to
governance (Arthers et al., 2009) and boards
(Callen et al., 2009) which is also the lens this
manuscript will pursue. The merger of these
perspectives allows for an interesting
interconnection between the two which better
explains what may occur for boards at small
firms. Members with access to resources will
not only provide the firm with at least some
level of access to these resources, but these
resources will also influence their capabilities
for monitoring. That being, the essence of
monitoring is integrated into the resources that
these board members have at their fingertips.
Meaning, the two are not mutually exclusive
albeit we can address them separately in the
following sections.
Monitoring
Despite the interrelationship, these two
functions may each have their own respective
roles pertaining to firm size. Monitoring is the
mechanism to help reduce the agency
problem. This is also often referred to as the
control role (e.g., Boyd, 1990; Hillman,
Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008) and is a
fundamental function of each board. Each
director is responsible for this at least to some
extent. This function looks out for the various
stakeholders whom can be separated into
many different groups depending on the firm
(shareholders, owners, etc.). Because a
primary function is to align the investor’s
interests with that of the manager, incentive
pay is often tied to manager compensation to
better align interests between the two parties
(Garen, 1994). However, are differences in
agency problems and monitoring mechanisms

Furthermore, such monitoring plays a smaller
collective role in smaller firms, the
responsibilities of this function are in fact
quite different for directors in small firms
versus directors in large firms. For instance,
because larger firms are more likely to be
traded on various stock markets, monitoring
directors who are more knowledgeable in
48
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often the owner(s) who manages the firm
assembles the board of directors (Vesper,
1990). Under these circumstances, boards for
small firms are more likely to be tied to the
owner which develops from a smaller circle of
possible board members (Mosakowski, 1998).
They are likely chosen more for their
provision of resources and less for the
monitoring capabilities and thus we present
the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Small firm boards will
have less autonomy over monitoring
because directors will be more likely
owner appointed.

finance and trading will have greater
capabilities in monitoring (Xie, Davidson &
DaDalt, 2003). Large firm board members
who are more familiar of complex structures
(e.g., through experience) will also have
greater capabilities in monitoring the greater
variety of C-level and upper management
positions (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008).
Alternatively, director members of small firms
may have greater monitoring capabilities if
they are familiar with the industry in order to
benchmark the managing position against that
of other similar firms (Rosenstein, 1988).
Furthermore, small firm board members
familiar with general small business practices
and principles will also provide greater
monitoring capabilities to these sized firms
due to their exposure and valuable experiences
in similar capacities. Accordingly, in addition
to the greater collective focus on monitoring
in large firms, board member specific
capabilities may vary and the variance in these
capabilities may better lend themselves to a
certain firm size.
Proposition 3: Firm size will moderate
the relationship between member
diversity and the monitoring demands
such that large firms will place greater
emphasis on finance and structure
knowledge to monitor while small
firms will place greater emphasis on
industry and small business knowledge
to monitor.

Provisions of Resources
The provision of resources allows for board
members to reduce uncertainty in the firm
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resources provide
firms with access to human capital and
network capital. Although perhaps not fully
developed, RDT and boards have received
notable attention. Hillman and colleagues
(2000) suggested the various roles could be
broken down into insiders (e.g., firm
knowledge), business experts (e.g., expertise
on competition), support specialists (e.g.,
experience in law or banking), and community
influentials
(e.g.,
influence,
power,
legitimacy). (Hillman et al., 2000). The
combination of these resources can make
board members very valuable to the firm. As
mentioned, those board members with greater
access to resources may also be networked and
interlocked with other board members not
only gaining the firm access to resources, but
also providing board members with the
knowledge to better monitor. Whereas
monitoring keeps activities in check,
provision of resources can provide a whole
new wealth of capabilities (Arthurs et al.,
2009). As monitoring was suggested to play a
larger portion of the director activities in the

Board members are appointed for different
reasons between small and large firms (Coles,
Daniel, & Naveen, 2012). The process is more
formal in large firms where stock prices may
react to the appointments (Shivdasani &
Yermack, 1999); and are also more likely to
be
conducted
based
on
outside
recommendations separate from what the
CEO and managers may desire (Shivdasani &
Yermack, 1999). However, in a small firm,
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support specials, and community influentials)
whereas large firms are more concerned with
emphasis on business experts (Singh,
Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008) and
community influence (Huang, Vodenska,
Wang, Halvin, & Stanley, 2011).
Proposition 6: Firm size will moderate
the relationship between member
diversity and the resource demands
such that there should be a greater
emphasis on networks in large firms
whereas well-rounded access to
various resources in smaller firms.

larger firm, resource dependence roles may
likely represent a greater role in smaller firms.
Proposition 5: The provision of
resources function will differ based on
size of the firm such that the provision
of resources will play a larger role for
boards of directors in smaller firms.
All firms need access to resources but the
following paragraph posits that smaller and
larger firms will have much different needs
from these resources. For example, a smaller
firm might be very pleased to find out board
member X is (or knows) a lawyer that could
draft legal documents. This differs from large
firm Y which likely has internal corporate
attorneys to draft such documents. In smaller
firms, directors’ capabilities are sometimes
used in lieu of recruiting full-time employees
(Bennett & Robson, 2004). Cost concerns
(e.g., salary and benefits) and moving new
associates down a learning curve to help them
understand
the
business
could
be
counterproductive to the business in the short
term. Hence, creating an opportunity for the
director at a smaller firm to engage with the
owner in operating the business alleviates this
concern in the short-term. Engaging in
operating the business creates an additional
demand on one’s time for smaller firm
directors versus large firm directors, hence
assisting the owner by “stewarding” for the
business and providing skills and expertise.

DISCUSSION
Small business makes up a great deal of the
American economy (U. S. Census Bureau,
2012) and hence the implications for this type
of research are important and widespread.
With attention to board of director members
and even boards of advisors, small firms can
set themselves up to have better monitors and
have access to great and pertinent resources in
order to reach their potential whether that be
profits, growth, market share, or goals (for
non-profit small firms). The combination of
these two functions will lead firms to achieve
these
varying
goals.
Additionally,
management may be positioned to make better
strategic actions and decisions by better
aligning boards through diversity and relevant
experience. Ultimately, addressing these
needs will better prepare a small firm for
success in comparison to other small firms that
more arbitrarily (or less thoughtfully) develop
their boards. In essence, comprehensive
attention to these potential firm resources
(monitoring ability and provisions of
resources) can lead to better firm performance.
This is not to overlook larger firms and the
attentiveness they should give to selecting
their board of directors. More so, to note that
the selection of each member should be

Endless applicable examples could be listed,
but providing readers with one should give an
idea that although resources remain an
important contribution made by board
members, various resources and specifics
about these resources will greatly differ based
on the needs that the firm has as dependent on
its size. Based on the prior listed fundamental
resource areas (Hillman, et al., 2000), small
firms will derive significant value from all
four areas (e.g., insiders, business experts,
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some studies trichotomize firm size (e.g.,
Roza, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2011), but
even this procedure may not catch all of the
possibilities and nuances. Additionally, firm
size may change over time as a firm evolves
out of the start-up phase. It would be
beneficial to know more about how board
composition changes as firms grow, stabilize,
or decline in size and if they conscientiously
seek out different types of board members.
Our research suggests they should, but
knowing more about the results when they do
would be helpful to firms that are undergoing
size fluctuation. Second, testing these
propositions could provide for empirical
validity in addition to the prior theoretical
rationale. To do so, one could likely obtain
data on large firms through secondary data,
such as the board analyst database. However,
for the smaller firms, surveys or some other
means of primary data collection would likely
be necessary.

careful and in a manner that can help lead to
better performance due to the differing needs
of smaller firms. As we also mentioned, small
firm board members receive much less (if any)
compensation and thus the nature of acquiring
talented individuals who can appropriately
serve becomes a more challenging but
worthwhile endeavor. Therefore, all else
equal, small firms which put forth the effort
and successfully comprehensively capitalize
on both their monitoring and resource
provisions will have better performance over
other small firms which do not.
Limitations and Future Research
There are a few limitations that should be
noted. First, as a theoretical piece, many of the
propositions remain untested. Though the
suggestions are underpinned in prior research
and theory, it is difficult to say what exactly
would be the ideal board member and
composition for small firms. Secondly, due to
the wealth of research conducted regarding
boards, RDT, AT, and firm size, as well as
stewardship theory, it was not feasible to
survey and include all of the literature.
Although this manuscript draws attention to
differences in size, there is additional
literature along with data that would have led
to a more comprehensive study as to what
small and large firm need from their boards of
directors. Relatedly, while it was convenient
for us to consider firms as small or large, some
limitations (as well as future research) exist
due to our dichotomous rather than continuous
frame of reference. These are our greatest
limitations; admittedly, others are also likely
to exist.
Future research could include a more
comprehensive look at firm size (i.e., more
than two groups). This might lead researchers
to find fundamental differences at various
levels rather than by simply distinguishing
between small and large firms. For example,

Broadly speaking, the board of director
literature within corporate governance has
given much greater emphasis to the large firm.
It is now time for small firm board research to
catch up. Collecting data for the small firms is
a necessary step in order for small businesses
and entrepreneurs to have a better grasp on
their needs from a board of directors or a board
of advisors and a means in which they can find
greater success.
Practical Implications
The concepts discussed in this manuscript
should help lead to a better and more full
understanding as to what a firm may need
from their board members. The practical
implications of this research may present
greater advancement for small firms for it is at
this level that the board member resources can
be better tested in the future. As suggested,
small firms may want to pay particularly close
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the lockup period. Journal of Business
Venturing, 24(4), 360-372.
Baysinger, B., & Butler, H. (1985). Corporate
governance and the board of directors:
Performance effects of changes in board
composition.
Journal
of
Law,
Economics, & Organization, 1(1), 101124.
Bennett, R. J., & Robson, P. J. A. (2004). The
role of boards of directors in small and
medium-sized firms. Journal of Small
Business and Enterprise Development,
11(1), 95-113.
Boeker, W., & Goodstein, J. (1991).
Organizational
performance
and
adaptation: Effects of environment and
performance on changes in board
composition. Academy of Management
Journal, 34(4), 805-826.
Boyd, B. (1990). Corporate linkages and
organizational environment: A test of the
resource dependence model. Strategic
Management Journal, 11(6), 419-430.
Brinckmann, J., Grichnik, D., & Kapsa, D.
(2010). Should entrepreneurs plan or just
storm the castle? A meta-analysis on
contextual factors impacting the
business
planning-performance
relationship in small firms. Journal of
Business Venturing, 25, 24-40.
Callen, J., Klein, A., & Tinkelman, D. (2009).
The contextual impact of nonprofit board
composition
and
structure
on
organizational performance: Agency and
resource dependence perspectives.
International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations, 21(1), 101125.
Carter, S., & Cannon, T. (1992). Women as
entrepreneurs: A study of female
business owners, their motivations,
experiences and strategies for success.
London: Academic Press.

attention to the resources each member is able
to provide. It is also at the small firm level
where many of the board members are often
affiliated with the owners which may impact
monitoring. Addressing these items and laying
out what a small firm needs from their board
of directors or board of advisors is critical.
Through appropriate planning, small firms
may be accordingly provided with greater firm
performance.
CONCLUSION
In following suit with others (e.g., Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003), the preceding content
attempted to theoretically merge AT and RDT
as a means to distinguish between board of
director functions and address the moderating
effect of firm size. As argued, the function of
monitoring and function of the provision of
resources should be addressed differently
based on firm size. Lastly, it is suggested that
meeting these demands could help provide for
enhanced firm performance while calling
more specific attention to small firms. It’s with
hope that this work leads to the three
suggested contributions: address differences
in firm size in corporate governance, provide
attention to strategic small firm board
membership, and offer some practical
applications to the many small firms looking
to improve performance outcomes.
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